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American War in the 1990s
DAVID G-. DELANEY

REVIEW OF DAVID HIALBERSTAM

War in a Time of Peace:Bush, Clinton, and the Generals
(New York: Scribner,2001) $28 cloth
George W. Bush's war against terrorism reminds Americans how a unifying
theme or organizing principle in foreign affairs can center a president's policy,
particularly with respect to the use of military force. In contrast, the last decade
in global events was characterized largely by internal and ethnic conflict, humanitarian crises, and the emergence of a unipolar international system-traits that
do not readily suggest a single (or clear) mission for U.S. military forces. Yet U.S.
troops undertook new missions in Africa, Central America, and Europe during
the 1990s without a coherent concept of where to intervene or how to define success. War in a Time ofPeace describes the processes that sent Americans to confront crises in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and particularly Kosovo, though not
Rwanda. David Halberstam succeeds brilliantly in relating many of the important domestic and international events that frame those operations through the
eyes of those who planned and directed them.
Halberstam's success, as in The Best and the Brightest,his acclaimed account
of America's involvement in Vietnam, derives primarily from his broad scope and
eloquent, novel-like narrative. He draws substance from interviews with dozens of
senior civilian and military policymakers from the Bush and Clinton administrations and links their past foreign policy experiences to their current professional
responsibilities. Larry Eagleburger, the Kissinger protdg6 admired within his
department as the only foreign service officer to serve as secretary of state, battled
with his conscience on supporting the independence-minded Croats and Slovenes.
Les Aspin, the former House Armed Services Committee chairman and long-time
secretary of defense aspirant, unsuccessfully sought access to and guidance from
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the president and took the fall for failure in Somalia. Tony Lake and Richard
Holbrooke, the bright survivors of disaffected 1960s and 1970s foreign service
officers, argued that intervention in Bosnia need not repeat the failures they witnessed in Vietnam. Halberstam asserts that despite this abundance of bright
minds, extensive experience, and personal commitment to effective foreign policy,
the lack of clearly articulated national interests hindered America's ability to use
military force appropriately.
Through chapter-length biographies and psychoanalytical sketches of the
key players, Halberstam points to interpersonal dynamics as largely determinative
in shaping U.S. military action. Madeleine Albright is the outside-the-boys-club
academic whose public grandstanding as
UN ambassador and secretary of state disDespite this abundance
tanced her from fellow policymakers and
marginalized her effectiveness in calling for
of bright minds, extensive
earlier action in Kosovo. General Wesley
experience, andpersonal
Clark is the do-good officer of tomorrow's
commitment to effective
military who stepped too heavily on
Pentagon toes and too quickly into White
foreign policy, the lack of
clearly articulatednationa House decision-making circles to win
Kosovo his way. And President Clinton is
interests hinderedAmerica the "emotionally-truncated man-child" who
ability to use military
spent 25 percent of his time on foreign
affairs (compared to 60 percent for other
force appropriately.
presidents) believing that his foreign policy
advisers should conjure up effective crisisut
his
guidance. As Halberstam demonstrates,
response plans h la carte witho
Somalia and Bosnia proved that Clinton could not choose a military course of
action or long-term policy program in the same way he polled Americans for a
centrist position on tricky domestic issues. In fact "centering" foreign policy
might require a worldview reflecting the commander in chief's vision-a point
Halberstam shows that Clinton learned belatedly and only while searching for his
presidential legacy in Middle East peace efforts.
As in Halberstam's previous works, War in a Time of Peace is not policy
analysis but journalistic history, and as such it includes all the requisite references
to 1990s pop-political waypoints. "It's the economy, stupid" marks the 1992 election, and the physical evidence that Monica Lewinsky produced against President
Clinton encouraged the "vast right-wing conspiracy" against him. These events
occasionally draw Halberstam into moderate overstatement and passing commentary that many will find distracting if not erroneous. According to him, Ken
Starr's inquiry into Lewinsky's book-buying habits is "not one of American
democracys finest moments," and Clinton, despite his transgressions, did not
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diminish the office of the presidency but merely "his own presidency." Yet these
traits of the genre do not interfere with Halberstam's ability to elucidate the Bush
and Clinton decision-making processes.
As a tool to explain why the United States (and the world) ignored genocide in Rwanda and failed to intervene sooner in Bosnia and Kosovo, however,
the book's focus on interpersonal relationships has limited.effectiveness. Although
Vietnam's shadows are unavoidable in this tale, Halberstam implicitly captures
the increasing difficulty of relying on Cold War-era terminology to assess contemporary political-military policies. Policymakers themselves are no longer
simply "hawks" or "doves." One must consider, for example, the events that led
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to evolve rather quickly from a position
of skepticism and inaction to one advocating uncompromising victory in the
Kosovo air war. Equally essential to understanding the period are NATO's struggle to define its role as it approached its fiftieth anniversary the role of international law in prohibiting Kosovo-like wars in the name of humanitarian goals,
and the status of America's military in society. Unfortunately, Halberstam provides almost no detail on these topics.
For example, the discussion of consequential military matters ends with
cursory treatment of tensions among the military's "intellectual" and "warrior"
senior leaders and the 1993 "don't ask, don't tell" policy. More revealing of the
serious strains placed on the 1990s military
were the numerous issues related to reshaping the military into a war-in-a-time-of- The use of militaryforce
peace fighting force without sacrificing the always amounts to defacto
ability to win decisively in large-scale, con- warfighting,whetherforces
ventional combat. The defense department
are protectingSomalian
instituted a bottom-up budget review and
struggled with the two-major regional con- food convoys or compelling
flict model, and the army departed from its Slobodan Milosevics
air-land battle doctrine and developed a
compliance in Kosovo.
light brigade concept that is just now being
tested in the field. In essence, every smallunit leader training for an "operation other than war" was concerned about how
closed bases, reduced troop levels, changed promotion-systems, altered equipment procurement programs, decreased training funds, restructured retirement
benefits, and increased operations tempo would affect his unit's ability to fight
and win.
Nevertheless, Halberstam's themes are clear and inescapable. The use of
military force always amounts to de facto warfighting, not antiseptic treatment,
whether forces are protecting Somalian food convoys or compelling Slobodan
Milosevic's compliance in Kosovo. Diplomatic efforts, such as Warren
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Christopher's failed May 1993 trip to engage European allies on lifting the arms
embargo and using airpower in Bosnia, require strategic forethought, resolve, and
leadership. Finally, President Clinton remained personally uncommitted to his
policies, particularly by limiting the U.S. force commitment in Bosnia to one
year and by hedging on whether to use ground troops in Kosovo.
While grand political-military strategy alone never guarantees successful
foreign policy, by definition it provides a guiding principle, a "centering" theme,
on which the labyrinthine, bureaucratic policymaking process of modern governance necessarily relies. Presidents play the critical role in setting that agenda, and
ad hoc programs may not suffice. As the war on terrorism demonstrates, a central tenet in foreign policy need not prescribe precisely when to commit
American forces or how to set correlative political goals, but does need to provide
an organizing principle on which bureaucratic organizations can respond when
required. Failing to stake out this center, wherever it lies on the political spectrum, may doom an administration to failure. In presenting this perspective, War
in a Time ofPeace helps elucidate 1990s American foreign policy decision making
and encourages Americans to consider that their role in foreign policy success
begins long before crises appear as news broadcasts-it begins with the election
of the president. m
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